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Because federal funding for wastewater projects falls so
far short of what’s needed, local governments must get
as much mileage as possible from what’s available. Learning
from the experience of communities that have solved their
wastewater problems can help. Here’s one instructive
story.
A State of Concern
In a state in which water is a scarce resource, protecting
drinking water from contamination is vitally important, and
“boil water” orders are cause for alarm. New Mexico’s
Environment Department, which issues such orders from time
to time, has dutifully reported, since 1988, in every biennial
report to Congress mandated by the Clean Water Act, that “Household
septic tanks and cesspools constitute the single largest source
of ground water contamination in the State.”
Indeed, the department has found that these household systems
have contaminated more water supply wells, and more acre-feet
of ground water, than all other sources combined.
New Mexico is one of the poorest states in the union. Many
of its communities are so small that installing costly central
sewer systems to solve wastewater problems makes no sense.
But upgrading the way household sewage treatment and disposal
systems are managed does, and in May 2005 the department held
over 20 public meetings around the state to explain new rules
designed to promote just that.
The stakes are high: protecting drinking water for current
and future generations, protecting property values, and investing
in the infrastructure essential to attract new residents and
badly needed economic development.
A Timely Model
The state’s initiative makes especially timely the story
of one tiny New Mexico village that’s way out in front
on this issue. Willard, population 234, has transformed its
wastewater handling by adopting centralized management of
a physically decentralized system that tailors a mix of advanced
technology and conventional septic tanks to site conditions
and appropriate treatment levels. This represents a radical
upgrade from a situation in which until recently about 40%
of village homes had no septic tanks at all.
Improbable? Yes. Serendipity played a big role: sizeable
one-time grants and low-cost loans were made available, and
a committed, resourceful state employee championed Willard’s
project and persevered. But even with these lucky breaks,
Willard has had to struggle to achieve its success, and its
project was nearly derailed by community resistance. Thus,
it illuminates challenges many communities may face.
That Lonesome
Whistle
Willard occupies less than a square mile of rural Torrance
County, 63 miles southeast of Albuquerque. It was once a rail
shipping point for ranchers and farmers, but farming declined
and population fell. The Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway still runs through the village, but trains don’t
stop there any more. With no industry or commerce, Willard
has little economic base. Household incomes are low. Children
are bused to schools in nearby towns.
Land use is primarily residential and agricultural. Most
residences are single-family homes constructed on site, mobile
homes, and manufactured housing. The village has no zoning.
Only one street is paved.
The mayor, a retiree in his 80s, and four-member council
work part-time. Low property values mean low property tax
revenues. And because Willard has virtually no commerce, the
gross receipts tax on commercial transactions, the lifeblood
of most New Mexico communities, generates virtually no revenue.
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| An Orenco AdvanTex system in the ground. |
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| The AdvanTex engineered media filter bed. |
A Central Well
is Jeopardized
Willard sits on flat terrain in a region characterized as
semiarid high desert. Like most New Mexico communities it
obtains its drinking water from groundwater. Not only is water
in short supply; the physical setting offers little forgiveness
for polluting it.
Willard’s government operates the village drinking water
system. In 1971 it sited its well in the center of town, to
minimize the amount of pipe laid to each home and thus construction
costs. With most water users concentrated within 50 acres
around the well, this concentrated wastewater, too.
But like many communities, Willard left households to manage
water after it’s used. Their onsite systems took the
form of septic tanks and leachfields, and cesspools. The state
regulated onsite systems but hadn’t nearly enough staff
to enforce its rules.
In 1994 the village constructed a new drinking water system,
for 102 water-user accounts, virtually all of them households.
By the late 1990s, of the total of over 20,000 gallons of
wastewater discharged each day, approximately 40% was filtering
through soil within an 885-foot radius of the well.
Wastewater Becomes
a Public Issue
Louis Perea moved to Willard in 1996. Within two years of
acquiring the village cantina, he had to install an entire
new septic system. He assumed other properties might have
similar needs. Indeed, surface contamination was visible in
some yards near the village well. When he became a council
member, he began to think about the problem from a village
perspective. In 1999 he became mayor, and when he learned
the state had funding for wastewater projects, he asked for
a $50,000 loan to install 40 septic tanks.
The state’s Environment Department Construction Programs
Bureau arranges loans and grants to local governments for
water, wastewater, and solid waste projects. Richard Rose
now bureau chief, had long been convinced that the sensible
solution to small communities’ wastewater problems is
centralized management of decentralized systems—not the
costly sewer-system solution that sings a siren song to many
small communities. He knew that efforts to promote a sensible
solution needed to be scaled way up to meet the state’s
urgent needs. He believed that pointing to a successful model
in New Mexico could help.
Rose had obtained an EPA grant for a demonstration project
to produce model ordinances for managing decentralized systems
and a guide communities could use to adopt such systems. And
EPA had given the state a hardship grant for a wastewater
project. Willard met the grant criteria, and Rose believed
it could obtain required matching funds. Willard could become
the model New Mexico so badly needed.
But was a full-scale project warranted? While water samples
indicated that nitrate levels were rising, data were sparse
and not definitive. But drilling monitoring wells and conducting
extensive groundwater studies would be beyond Willard’s
budget. And spending more time and money couldn’t guarantee
better data – indeed more data could raise more questions
and delay action while contamination worsened. The physical
setting and its history had to be considered:
- The source of elevated levels of nitrates couldn’t
be industry: Willard has none. Groundwater flow gradients
and topography ruled out a nearby dairy farm. That left
human waste, which could contaminate drinking water with
disease pathogens, residues of medications, and other chemicals,
too.
- Data on the actual location and condition of septic systems
were far from complete, but approximately 40 of the village’s
102 water-system users were believed to lack septic tanks.
Of tanks known to exist, some were in poor condition. About
40 homes were within 885 feet of the village well; most
are within the 50 acres around it.
- Hand-dug wells close to onsite systems and cesspools
provided a conduit through which wastewater could migrate
to the drinking water source.
How could contamination not be a problem – and one that
would worsen?
A Demonstration
Project Is Born
Rose and Mayor Perea embarked upon an ambitious wastewater
project. The state would help arrange funding and provide
technical assistance; the village would make all decisions
and would consider adopting a centrally managed decentralized
system. The logic for one was compelling: Willard already
operated a drinking-water system; a wastewater system would
be a second, closely related, public utility. After all, the
same water enters and leaves people’s homes, and the
water that leaves can affect the quality of water that enters.
The mayor knew his first challenge would be winning the support
of the village council, which would be pioneering a project
for which there was no New Mexico precedent and which would
literally invade every resident’s backyard.
It would invade pocketbooks, too: the council would have
to impose a fee on each household to cover loan repayment
and system operations and maintenance costs. The village’s
investment in a new drinking water system had already raised
water bills, and the gas company had just raised its rates.
The council would shy from a project that entailed any costs—particularly
in the absence of an immediate crisis. This was only a crisis
in the making.
It would be a tough sell requiring a strong champion who
could build community support—ideally, this would be
a local resident. But Perea could devote little time to this
role, and no one else stepped forward. As Rose later explained
it, “Willard didn’t have one consistent sparkplug
because there’s less community there than meets the eye.
It’s not close-knit. There’s no local economy; residents
work out of town. Children go to school out of town. Many
people don’t have time to devote to civic matters.”
By default, the role of champion fell to Rose. For six years,
working from his office in Santa Fe and making many visits
to Willard, nearly two hours away, he’s persevered through
innumerable twists and turns to help the village realize its
goals. That the village had few staff and for some time lacked
a computer and Internet access didn’t make communication
easier.
The importance of a champion cannot be overstated.
Funding Is Assembled
Assembling grants and matching funds was a project in itself.
Construction Programs Bureau financial manager Ramona Rael
skillfully shepherded Willard through the process. Rich Rose
stresses that grants and low-interest loans can be assembled
from a number of sources, and adds that, by supplying their
own labor, communities can offset some costs (something Willard
didn’t do). “The more you do, the less you pay.”
By March of 2001—after resolution of several Catch 22s
involving Willard’s need for a bridge loan and for legal
services and almost two years after the project had begun—$572,700
was in place:
- EPA hardship grant: $389,700
- Clean Water State Revolving Fund loan: $63,000
- Special legislative appropriation: $30,000
- State Finance Authority grant: $90,000
Because total costs would substantially exceed this, construction
was structured in two phases. Willard’s initial applications
for Phase II funding were denied, but it eventually obtained
$715,000:
- State Finance Authority grant: $400,000
- Community Development Block Grant: $300,000
- State legislative appropriation: $15,000
Total funding was $1,287,700.
Making the System
“Legit”
But funding alone wasn’t enough to proceed. Willard would
be transforming the ad-hoc way wastewater had been managed
into a village-administered utility that would encompass not
just new systems installed in the course of the project, but
all systems already in place and added in the future. Residents
would pay for costs not covered by grant monies. Could the
village legally exercise the sweeping set of functions required
to implement and administer this system? Among them:
- obtain easements so construction could proceed
- require any unwilling homeowners to accept installation
of an onsite system
- impose a fee on homeowners to repay the state loan and
pay for operations and maintenance
- gain access to private property to inspect, maintain,
and repair system components and pump septic tanks
- impose standards for septic tanks and penalties for noncompliance
- require builders of new homes to install—at their
own expense—onsite systems that meet performance standards
An attorney Rose engaged to examine case law determined that
it could support explicit authorities. The state prepared
a model ordinance explicitly establishing them. Willard eventually
adopted it.
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| A view of the finished treatment
site in Willard. |
Enter the Engineer
Because much follows from selection of the engineering firm,
Willard handled this carefully. A citizen advisory committee,
coached by a consultant, reviewed firms’ proposals. They
dismissed one candidate as “too technical,” expressing
their strong preference for an engineer whose explanations
they could understand.
But What Does That Engineering Report Mean?
The engineering report is a crucial document. Ideally, it
would be easy for local officials to understand and explain
to the public. But Willard’s wasn’t, in part because
it was designed to respond to a complex set of federal and
state requirements.
The Environment Department has since won agreement from three
other funding agencies to use one set of criteria. This has
resulted in documents that are easier to understand and evaluate.
Willard’s engineer suggests that a plain-English abstract
with illustrations could help lay readers. Former mayor Perea
observes that documents, however clearly written, may not
matter much: residents learn best through discussion and tabletop
exhibits.
The winning firm, Engineers Inc., headquartered in Silver
City, serves clients in rural New Mexico. Willard defined
its fees not as a percentage of construction costs but as
fees for specific services performed, to remove any perception
that the firm might have an incentive to design a needlessly
costly system. (Conversely, this protects firms when less
costly projects demand more work.)
Dennis Wagner has handled the Willard project for Engineers
Inc. He observes that many engineers and regulators are invested
in old technologies and resist new ones, and he advises small
communities to select an engineer who will offer options for
less expensive ways of solving wastewater problems. But he
also stresses the importance of “striking a balance between
reliability and innovation.” Established companies are
likelier to be around to make good on warranties and provide
needed parts, but they may not offer the innovative technologies
appropriate to small communities that smaller, newer companies
offer.
Wagner has worked to help village officials and residents
better understand the project’s technical dimensions,
and by attending public meetings he’s helped build confidence
in it. Beware, he cautions: “It’s an education process,
and it takes time.” You encounter not only different
levels of technical understanding; personalities matter, too.
Patience is the watchword.
Surveying Site
Conditions and Building Support
To formulate technical options and recommend a solution, the
engineering firm had to understand baseline conditions. This
required a homeowner survey to determine what residents knew
about the systems on their property—or the lack thereof—and
a field survey to verify, correct, and supplement homeowners’
statements.
Each survey was carefully planned and explained through flyers
and at public meetings. Having someone other than the engineering
firm manage the surveys avoided any perception that findings
might be skewed to benefit the firm. The Rural Assistance
Community Association (RCAC) filled this role. http://www.rcac.org/
This also mitigated another problem. A survey is, by its
nature, intrusive and bureaucratic. Willard’s older Hispanic
residents might not want to share information about themselves
with strangers. Moreover, although homeowners were assured
no enforcement actions would be taken, some who knew their
systems were substandard might not want to cooperate. RCAC
staff, accustomed to working in rural communities, might win
cooperation.
Several residents volunteered to help, and their participation
not only made the homeowner survey less intrusive; it signaled
local support and raised the project’s visibility, literally
“bringing it home.” Not least, the surveys helped
illuminate for residents the physical reality of wastewater
problems.
But the surveys didn’t get off to a smooth start. The
village lacked an accurate, detailed map. Some property had
been abandoned. County tax data on property boundaries and
ownership weren’t up-to-date. Street numbers for houses
existed only on paper. (The Postal Service doesn’t deliver
mail to Willard homes.) Drawing from fire department information,
aerial photos, and a village clerk’s local knowledge,
RCAC staff eventually created a color-coded map that depicted
conditions household by household.
Another problem: volunteers gave homeowners survey forms
to complete instead of querying homeowners and filling out
the forms themselves. Some people who didn’t know exactly
what was in their backyards reported they had a “cesspool,”
although in fact they had a standard septic system. And some
new residents didn’t know their system’s age or
history, or where the septic tank was located.
Field verification was conducted by a local septic-tank pumper
under subcontract to RCAC. Because he was trusted by residents,
some homeowners who had refused RCAC staff access to their
property admitted him. Results largely confirmed what homeowners
had reported. Of 79 homes surveyed,
- 46 used septic tanks with a leach field
- 4 used septic tanks without a leach field
- 24 used cesspools, seepage pits, holding tanks, or lacked
a system altogether
- 36 were operating systems more than 10 years old
- 29 percent were reported to have problems including odors,
sewage backups, and sewage surfacing in yards
Sure enough: some systems had not been permitted by the
state or predated permitting requirements.
The Technical
Solution
To bring this hodge-podge into regulatory compliance at the
lowest cost, the engineer divided Willard into three zones
based on distance from the village well. Radii were computed
by estimating the amount of nitrogen in wastewater and the
extent to which rainfall, percolation, and soil conditions
would dilute it before it reached groundwater.
- Zone A is the critical area within a 900-foot radius
of the well. The most densely settled zone, it contains
40 homes and an estimated 104 residents. Because the risk
of groundwater contamination is greatest here, if treated
effluent were discharged into the ground, nitrogen levels
would have to be reduced to 10 milligrams per liter, the
regulatory standard. Achieving this level of treatment would
be costly
- Zone B lies between 900 and 1400 feet of the well. Here,
nitrogen levels would have to be reduced to 20 milligrams
per liter.
- Hooking homes in both Zones A and B to treatment sites
constructed in Zone B would save money.
- Zone C lies furthest from the well. Because it has no
known impact on the well, nitrogen levels could be reduced
to between 30 and 60 milligrams per liter. And because it’s
sparsely settled, constructing treatment sites there or
hooking septic tanks in that zone to treatment sites in
Zone B wouldn’t be cost-effective or necessary to meet
regulatory standards. For Zone C, septic tanks and leach
fields alone could be adequate and cheaper.
Phase I of the project would address homes in the critical
zone closest to the well, to eliminate cesspools and substandard
systems. Phase II would address remaining homes. As the project
progressed and funding constraints became evident, the system
evolved.
New septic tanks, owned by the village, were installed in
Zones A and B. Gravity carries effluent from each tank through
small-diameter pipes to one of three cluster treatment systems
located in Zone B, on land owned by the village. Effluent
treated by each cluster discharges into a leach field constructed
next to it. Each cluster serves approximately 20 homes and
could be expanded to accommodate future growth, for a total
of 40 homes per cluster. Employing only three cluster systems
increased the length of pipe laid but overall significantly
reduced costs of construction and operations and maintenance.
Collection and treatment systems are underground. Pipes were
laid in alleys to minimize conflicts with the drinking water
system.
In Zone C, work remains to be done: new septic tanks will
be installed and leach fields constructed and upgraded. But
no cesspools remain in the village.
Because a mix of advanced technology and conventional septic
tanks was tailored to site conditions, only work essential
to bringing each piece of property into compliance was performed,
reducing costs. And because the system meets current needs
only, residents pay only for what they need; the modular approach
allows for future expansion, paid for in the future.
The cluster systems are Orenco http://orenco.com/main_index.asp
AdvanTex Treatment Systems. Each includes a fiberglass basin
filled with a textile-based medium—a highly absorbent,
engineered textile with about five times more surface area
than sand or gravel; it treats lots of wastewater in a small
space. Within the tank, a timer governs the rate at which
small doses of effluent are applied to the filter, to percolate
through and between textile sheets. The greater the flow of
wastewater, the more frequent the pulses. Treated effluent
is returned to the inlet end of the tank where a splitter
valve routes some of it to the leach field and blends the
remainder with raw influent to recirculate, repeating the
process and further refining the effluent.
The treatment system and leach field constitute a bioremediation
process; no manufactured chemicals are used. At each cluster,
a web-based, telemetry monitoring system permits a remote
operator to monitor system performance, diagnose problems,
and adjust the timer.
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| Willard's onsite system is a low-profile
solution. |
The Potential
Deal-Breaker
As recounted so far, Willard’s story sounds straightforward:
There’s a serious problem; state and local officials
take action to address it; an engineer devises a solution.
Pretty soon, everybody will be living happily ever after,
drinking clean water every day. The reality was different.
There was resistance to the project, not only within the
community but within the council, and if a council member
chose not to attend a meeting, lack of a quorum could delay
progress. As Louis Perea recalls, “At one meeting, the
council might be supportive; by the next meeting, if they’d
talked to opponents of the project, their views could have
shifted.” Not surprisingly, in this low-income community
the potential deal-breaker was cost. Funding had greatly reduced
Willard’s costs—but not to zero. Each household
would have to pay a monthly fee for operations and maintenance
and a $3 monthly fee to repay the state construction loan.
The engineer estimated that the total could eventually rise
to $15.
A Public Information
and Involvement Campaign
To overcome resistance, residents would have to understand
their self-interest:
- Not only public health, but the viability of the village
was threatened. Future generations could be harmed.
- All residents would benefit from protecting the common
source of drinking water.
- It would be cheaper for each household if the village
operated a compliant system than if each household paid
to achieve and maintain its own compliance. Costs could
be shared, and several tanks could be pumped at once. Absent
village management, that estimated $15 a month could climb
to $35.
Rose helped the village conduct vigorous outreach efforts,
and he engaged two consultants who made several visits to
Willard to work with residents. Louis Perea (who is no longer
mayor) advises “Involve as many people as you can; you’ll
need a lot of help!”
Willard residents stepped forward to play several roles,
some already cited above. Coached by a consultant, an advisory
committee reviewed engineering proposals and recommended a
firm; this equipped them to be advocates for the project,
too. Some residents informally reviewed the engineer’s
report. Some helped conduct the baseline survey; almost all
cooperated with it. Some made their private wells available
for water-quality sampling. Some helped the village identify
owners of property needed for easements.
Participation not only signaled and helped build support;
it helped build the sense of ownership residents would need
to maintain the system over the long-term. Another benefit:
residents’ local knowledge proved valuable in understanding
wastewater problems.
Misconceptions
and Resistance
The best way to sell the project, Perea recalls, was the simplest:
talk with individuals one-on-one. Recognize that there will
be resistance, then “listen to what people say and help
them understand the benefits. If you turn one person around,
that might extend to other families.”
And when you listen, what might you hear? (Typical questions
are captured in the sidebar.) Some residents thought Perea
was promoting the project because it would benefit him. He
had to explain he’d already invested in his own septic
system; his motivation was to benefit the village and future
generations. He suggested residents look at neighboring properties,
note whether water was visible on the ground, and consider
whether their own systems were adequate. He recalls that some
residents said they’d lived with such conditions for
years and had come to accept them.
One resident said, “My daughter moved into a mobile
home, and I had to spend several thousand dollars to fix her
septic system. Why should I have to pay to solve other people’s
problems?” This equity issue cut deep. Indeed, current
mayor Alphonso Valdez a councilman when the project began,
did not initially support it. When he moved to Willard he’d
installed a septic system at his own expense. When he moved
within Willard he’d paid to install another. He didn’t
want to pay for other people’s systems. Moreover, as
a public official he was sensitive to the plight of residents
on small fixed incomes, and he could point to no groundswell
of support for the project. Only gradually did he come to
appreciate its value.
Resistance to cost was compounded by the fact that the fee
would be new: households had never paid the village for wastewater
services, and some had evidently never paid for such services
at all.
But cost could mask other issues. As in many small communities,
some residents aligned along factions rooted in long-standing
animosities; some may have opposed the project because they
opposed its supporters. Perea says his goal was to bring Willard’s
residents together to see the value the wastewater project
held for all of them.
Former village clerk-treasurer Gayle Jones observes that
in New Mexico, a cultural factor operates, too: small Hispanic
communities tend to be deeply resistant to any kind of change.
Younger people leave; older people want to be left alone.
“This well has been there forever, and it will be here
for my grandkids,” is the kind of thinking that prevails.
Public Meetings
The project moved forward by way of formal actions taken by
the council, and its meetings became public meetings on the
project. Other meetings were held, too. All were heavily publicized
and carefully planned, but attendance was usually low. Village
clerk Joyce Garcia observes that while it’s important
to try to get people to attend, it may not be realistic to
expect them to. “People like to complain, but they don’t
want to go to meetings.” But over time, while a core
group kept showing up, other people attended, too; that is,
a larger total number of individuals appeared.
Particularly valuable in helping residents see that there
was a better option, recalls Perea, were tabletop models of
filtration systems. Also valuable was the participation of
people from state agencies who talked with residents and answered
questions. He remembers telling Rose, “We need all the
help you can bring in.”
Particularly early on, residents who voiced support, sometimes
in the face of opposition, helped create the conditions that
moved the project forward. While their role wasn’t highly
visible, it mattered.
Protest, but
the Council Proceds
But sure enough, 21 months into the project, the issue of
cost erupted. The council, having authorized the engineer
to proceed, was moving toward execution of the binding grant
and loan agreements necessary to launch Phase I construction.
To obtain funding, it would have to adopt an ordinance authorizing
it to levy the loan repayment fee on households. At a heavily
attended meeting, the council was presented with a petition
signed by 25 residents protesting the project’s cost
and disputing the need for it. Several hours of heated discussion,
including the resurrection of issues assumed to have been
closed, ensued
But many people voiced support for the project, and Mayor
Perea reminded protesters that the project had been well-publicized
and publicly deliberated. The council stood its ground, declaring
that the village had done too much to turn back and that the
project was essential. It proceeded to impose the monthly
fee and take other pivotal steps.
Second-Guesses
Might the volatile issue of cost been handled more effectively?
Should the monthly fee have been announced sooner and more
loudly—to give residents more time to understand, debate,
and perhaps come to accept it? Should more have been made
of the fact that had Willard borrowed all the money assembled,
the monthly loan repayment would have risen to more than $50?
That residents’ costs would have been much higher in
the absence of a village-managed system?
If a tougher message had been communicated at the outset
– Residents without adequate systems are violating state
groundwater regulations; this project can help them achieve
compliance — would the project have been more clearly
perceived as a solution rather than a problem? But in fact,
the state would have had to bring enforcement actions against
each household individually, not easy given staffing constraints.
And Gayle Jones doesn’t think it would have mattered
anyway. Things just would have “gotten ugly,” not
better.
She concludes that Willard never truly achieved community
buy-in, though not for lack of trying. Education is vitally
important, but “you can only do as much as you can do.”
Residents may eventually accept the system but not embrace
it.
Construction
Proceeds
With funding in hand and resolved to proceed, Willard selected
Yellow Horse Corp., of Magdalena, NM, as Phase I construction
contractor. Because few construction firms in the state have
experience with advanced onsite technologies, oversight was
particularly important, and the engineering firm monitored
progress closely. Dennis Wagner, the project engineer, stresses
the value of collaborating to adapt designs to field conditions,
as each party can generate approaches the other might not.
An Orenco field rep provided technical assistance, too, and
village officials, the contractor, the engineer, and sometimes
Rich Rose met on site, monthly, to coordinate.
Yellow Horse president Darryl Pettis found that construction
posed no serious problems. Because it entails “going
into people’s yards,” he points out the value of
hiring some workers who live in the community and are known
by residents. Putting some dollars into the local economy
by hiring locally is another plus.
Phase I construction ended in February 2003, and that portion
of the system began operating. For Phase II, Willard retained
the same engineering firm and selected Ruidoso-based Carl
Kelley Construction. Carl Kelley also stresses the value of
collaboration, and Gayle Jones remarks that communication
with residents was important, too: “You need to know
where residents want septic tanks placed; you need to be sensitive
to each property owner.”
Phase II began in September 2004, ran smoothly, and ended
in May 2005. Willard didn’t obtain all the funding it
needed for Phase II, but because at present the village is
short-staffed, it's not now pursuing a concluding Phase III.
Making the System
Succeed
The wastewater system is now serving most village homes. But
it continues to evolve. State standards for treating wastewater,
which have consequences for system design and operating costs,
are the subject of discussions, and the Environment Department,
village system operator, project engineer, Phase II construction
contractor, and Orenco are collaborating to resolve compliance
issues and optimize the bioremediation process. All parties
are fully committed to making the system a success. A big
help has been the system’s remote monitoring system,
which permits the Orenco dealer in Denver to fine-tune performance.
Administratively, requirements aren’t yet uniformly
enforced for owners of vacant or unused property who now want
to be part of the system. The personal relationships that
can shape local government have sometimes intruded.
But the important point is that Willard has protected its
well. Now, can the village successfully maintain its system
over the long-term? As Orenco’s Web site says, “It
takes more than a product, however, to solve onsite wastewater
problems. It takes a comprehensive program . . . that . .
. provides support for the life of the system.”
Many small communities contract out for inspection and maintenance
services. Willard chose to assign these duties to the village
employee who operates the drinking water system. In a village
that desperately needs jobs, this makes sense. But the position
has turned over three times since the start of operations.
Orenco has provided onsite training three times and is now
working closely with the current operator, Albert Padilla.
A Willard native, Padilla loves the village, cares about
protecting its drinking water, and is enthusiastic about his
work. Once the system is tuned, he says, it should be easy
to maintain. “It’s really neat!” he says. Construction
contractor Carl Kelley agrees that a “terrific advantage”
of the Orenco system is its ease of operation.
But the system operator is not the only person crucial to
the system’s success. Residents mustn’t dispose
of materials that could harm performance. Public education
efforts have been made; time will tell if they’re effective.
Residents must also allow access to their property, so septic
tanks can be inspected, maintained, repaired, and pumped.
Kelley observes that one downside of a decentralized system
is that residents of small villages don’t like outsiders
coming onto their property. The fact that Padilla is a Willard
native is an advantage here.
What Has the
Project Cost?
Project costs to date for engineering and construction are
$1,287,700. Dividing that by 102 water-system user accounts
yields $12,625 per household. If Willard pursues a Phase III,
this figure will rise, but not significantly.
The engineer had estimated that constructing a sewer system
would cost Willard roughly three-quarters again as much as
the option it chose. Rich Rose observes that the cost per
household of constructing a sewer system in a rural community
can be twice as high as Willard’s costs. The bottom line:
a decentralized system is a bargain.
The total monthly fee to homeowners, including the loan repayment,
is now $5 but will rise as operations proceed, perhaps to
the estimated $15.
Willard has put almost no village monies into the project,
but it’s realized revenue from it: happily, construction
activity was subject to the gross receipts tax!
What Took So
Long?
Originally, it was assumed that one year would elapse from
the state’s March 1999 meeting with the mayor to completion
of construction. Phase II construction ended in May 2005,
and some work remains to be done. In retrospect, delay seems
inevitable. Among its many sources:
- The project had no precedent in New Mexico from which
to learn. Funding and partnering arrangements were unique
and necessitated slow steps.
- The project lacked a full-time, local champion.
- It could be hard to schedule meetings. Rich Rose and
the engineer were based hours from Willard. Initially, the
village lacked e-mail, and the village clerk worked part-time;
this slowed communication. Staff turnover caused discontinuities.
- Lack of a council quorum delayed some steps. Sometimes
this reflected resistance within the council, which in turn
reflected lack of strong community support.
- The village had no attorney to review and certify documents;
it needed help obtaining legal services.
- A bridge loan from RCAC was delayed because records documenting
village incorporation had been destroyed in a fire in 1912
and because RCAC had to establish loan procedures.
- Acquiring easements and purchasing land for treatment
sites required identifying, locating, and contacting out-of-town
owners and determining fair market value. Data on village
property—location, ownership, infrastructure—were
inadequate.
- Phase II was delayed for lack of funding.
Notably, neither serious technical difficulties nor paperwork
caused delays. While village clerk Joyce Garcia notes that
paperwork could be burdensome, overall, the project wasn’t
viewed as presenting a confusing or intimidating process—probably
in part because Rich Rose never let it be.
Long Thoughts
on the Bottom Line
In the six years since Willard’s mayor first approached
the state, the project appears to have earned acceptance—or,
at least, opposition has abated. Have all the dollars, time,
and effort devoted to it been worth it?
A cynic could contend that, for a tiny village whose long-term
economic viability is uncertain, a $1.2 million-plus project
is extravagant. But taken together, its direct and indirect
benefits are impressive:
- Willard’s residents have protected their drinking
water, and if the system is maintained, future generations
will benefit too. What could have become a public health
crisis has been averted.
- Immediate health hazards and public nuisances have been
remediated.
- Property values have been protected.
- Homeowners are paying less than they’d have paid
for a central sewer system or to bring their own systems
into compliance and maintain them.
- In the course of construction, alleyways were cleaned
up, and the village’s overall appearance has improved.
- The village may be likelier to attract new residents
and businesses.
- The baseline survey produced a much more accurate map
of village infrastructure.
- The state now provides bridge loans for wastewater projects.
- The state has a model ordinance that communities can
adopt to establish the authorities needed to implement and
manage wastewater systems.
- The project offers a model from which other communities
can learn.
Indeed, the state’s long efforts to push the
Willard model are now generating pull. Engineers retained
by other New Mexico communities have been visiting Willard.
Cordova is about to start construction. Corona has an engineering
report and seeks funding. Elephant Butte and Corrales want
information. Attendees at the 2004 national conference of
the National Onsite Wastewater Recycling Association (NOWRA)
made a field trip from Albuquerque to see Willard’s system.
It’s hailed in EPA’s 2004 Clean Water State Revolving
Loan Fund annual report
Dennis Wagner, the project engineer, is convinced innovative
systems can help communities meet their obligations to manage
wastewater safely, and he believes a new era is dawning in
New Mexico. Rich Rose, reflecting upon the hard work it will
take to realize this vision, says flatly that what other communities
need to know is this: “It’s not easy; it is doable.”
CHRISTINE VAN LENTEN is a freelance writer living in
Brooklyn, NY.
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